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1A Novel Privacy Preserving Authentication and
Access Control Scheme for Pervasive Computing
Environments
Kui Ren, Student Member, IEEE, Wenjing Lou, Member, IEEE, Kwangjo Kim, Member, IEEE, and Robert Deng,
Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract Privacy and security are two important but seem-
ingly contradictory objectives in a pervasive computing envi-
ronment (PCE). On the one hand, service providers want to
authenticate legitimate users and make sure they are accessing
their authorized services in a legal way. On the other hand, users
want to maintain necessary privacy without being tracked down
for wherever they are and whatever they are doing. In this paper
we propose a novel privacy preserving authentication and access
control scheme to secure the interactions between mobile users
and services in PCEs. The proposed scheme seamlessly integrates
two underlying cryptographic primitives, blind signature and
hash chain, into a highly exible and lightweight authentication
and key establishment protocol. The scheme provides explicit mu-
tual authentication between a user and a service while allowing
the user to anonymously interact with the service. Differentiated
service access control is also enabled in the proposed scheme
by classifying mobile users into different service groups. The
correctness of the proposed authentication and key establishment
protocol is formally veried based on BAN logic.
Index Terms Security, Access Control, Authentication, Per-
vasive Computing Environments
I. INTRODUCTION
Pervasive computing environments (PCEs) with their in-
terconnected devices and abundant services promise great
integration of digital infrastructure into many aspects of our
lives, from our physical selves, to homes, offices, streets and so
forth [1], [38]. The huge number of communicating devices
provide seamless access to multiple dynamic networks any
time from any location. Users and their autonomous agents
will be able to traverse these networks, coexist with each
other and thus create a truly ubiquitous intelligent computing
environment.
As networking technologies become commonplace and cen-
tral to everyday life, companies, organizations and individuals
are increasingly depending on electronic means to process
information and provide relevant services in order to take
advantage of ambient intelligence in PCEs [2], [4], [5], [6],
[41]. Inevitably, many of these information transactions will
be sensitive and critical [19] and thus, it is essential to enforce
access control to prevent information leakage and service
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abuse, and to stop malicious attacks. In other words, dynamic
access to services should be granted only based on pre-
established (direct or indirect) trust between users and service
providers. To this end, trust relationship by means of mutual
authentication between users and service providers should be
established prior to the access of services. Traditional authen-
tication which focuses on identity authentication may fail to
work in PCEs, partly because it conflicts with the goal of user
privacy protection and partly because the assurance achieved
by entity authentication will be of diminishing value [19]. For
instance, a service provider may only concern whether the
accessing user is authorized or not, but has limited interest in
who she is in many non-critical scenarios. Meanwhile, services
themselves should be authenticated to users. Users will only
accept authenticated information from genuine services they
intend to interact with to avoid potential deception and other
malicious attacks. The importance of authenticating services
is discussed in [13].
Another big forthcoming challenge for actually deploying
pervasive computing services on a significant scale is how to
have adequate provision for handling user privacy, which is
considered as one of the fundamental security concerns that
are explicitly identified by a series of laws [3]. In environments
with significant concentration of “invisible” computing devices
gathering and collecting the identities, locations and transac-
tion information of users, users should rightly be concerned
with their privacy. At the same time, the physical outreach of
pervasive computing makes preserving users’ privacy a much
more difficult task [10], [15], [39].
Some of the user privacy issues that should be treated in
PCEs have been pointed out in [8], including location privacy,
connection anonymity and confidentiality. We further clarify
the scope of privacy in PCEs as follows. Anonymity: The
real identity of a user should never be revealed from the
communications exchanged between the user and a server
unless it is intentionally disclosed by the user. Different
communication sessions between the same user and service
should not be linkable. Context Privacy: Neither the service
nor other users of the service should be able to learn the exact
context information (e.g., location, duration, type of service
request, etc.) of a user, unless the user decides to divulge such
information. Users’ context information should be protected
against both outsiders and service providers they interact
with. Confidentiality and Integrity: The interactions between
a user and a service should have both confidentiality and
2integrity protections whenever such protections are required.
In reality, the quests for authentication/access control and
user privacy protection conflict with each other in many
aspects, and the problem is highly complex in PCEs as the
context information of users are more of a concern. On
the one hand, the service generally depends on the user
identity information and corresponding pre-established trust
relationship as well as the service contract between them to
accomplish user authentication and conduct access control. On
the other hand, the user does not want to be tracked by the
service for wherever she is and whatever she does. The trade-
off between the two thus poses a great challenge to security
designers.
In this paper, we propose a user privacy preserving au-
thentication and access control scheme at the application
level to address the security and user privacy concerns in
PCEs. The proposed scheme is implemented at the application
level without relying on any underlying system infrastructure
such as the Lighthouse or mist routers etc., as required by
many other approaches [2], [7], [8], [15]. The proposed
scheme provides explicit mutual authentication between the
two parties, while at the same time allowing the mobile
user to interact with the desired service anonymously without
revealing her identity. The scheme seamlessly integrates two
underlying cryptographic primitives, blind signature and hash
chain, into a highly flexible and lightweight authentication and
key establishment protocol. The scheme possesses many de-
sirable security properties, such as anonymity, non-linkability,
non-repudiation, accountability, differentiated services access
control, etc., with very low protocol complexity (refer to
Section V). The correctness of the proposed authentication
and key establishment protocol is also formally verified based
on BAN logic. To the best of our knowledge this work is the
first attempt to an authentication and key establishment pro-
tocol with formally verified correctness for privacy preserving
access control to differentiated services.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II we describe the system architecture of PCEs and introduce
the cryptographic primitives used in our scheme. We present in
detail the proposed scheme in Section III and show the formal
verification on its correctness in Section IV. Then we discuss
the security features and the performance of the proposed
scheme in Section V. Finally, we review the related work in
Section VI and conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC
PRIMITIVES
A sample system architecture of a campus PCE is given in
Fig. 1. Generally, a PCE consists of three types of entities:
mobile users, services and back end authentication servers,
in addition to the underlying wired and wireless communi-
cation infrastructures. Note that wireless network access is
itself a service. User privacy should be protected not only
from outsiders but also from network service providers. Our
proposed access control scheme is designed to secure the
interactions among these three types of entities as shown
in Fig. 2. More specifically, our scheme aims to provide
anonymous mutual authentication between the mobile user and
the service (e.g., wireless service access point for wireless
network access service). It also provides the confidentiality
and integrity protection for the communications between the
mobile user and the service.
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Fig. 1. A sample pervasive computing environment
Our scheme is based on two cryptographic techniques, blind
signature and hash chain. A brief review of the two techniques
is provided as follows.
Blind Signature: Blind signature scheme [16] is a variation
of digital signature scheme in which the content of a message
is disguised from its signer. Blind signature schemes can
be implemented based on a number of well known digital
signature schemes, such as RSA [33]. To produce a signature
on a message, a user first blinds the message with a blinding
function f , typically by combining it with a random blinding
factor k, and then forwards the blinded message to the signer.
The signer signs the blinded message using a standard signing
algorithm, say SA(m) which denotes the signature of A on
m, and sends the result back to the user, who then unblinds it
with an unblinding function g to obtain the signer’s signature
on the original message. The algorithm is designed such that
g(SA(f(m))) = SA(m).
Blind signatures are used to provide non-linkability, which
prevents the signer from linking a blinded message it signed
to the unblinded version that it may be called upon to verify.
In this case, the signed, blinded value is unblinded prior to
verification in such a way that the signature remains valid
for the unblinded message. This can be useful in schemes
where anonymity is required. Blind signature schemes find
a great deal of use in applications where sender privacy is
important. This includes various digital cash schemes and
voting protocols [17], [18].
Hash Chain: One-way hash function h is a powerful and
yet computational efficient cryptographic tool, which takes
a message of arbitrary size as its input and outputs a fixed
string of digits. The “one way” means that it’s computationally
infeasible to derive the original input from the output. By
applying h() repeatedly on an initial value m, one can obtain
a chain of outputs hj(m). These outputs can be used in the
reverse order of generation for the purpose of authentication:
hj−1(m) can be proven to be authentic if hj(m) has been
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Fig. 2. System architecture
proven to be authentic due to the one-wayness property of hash
function. Hash chains together with signatures are widely used
in micro-payment schemes such as Payword, iKP and Netcard
[31]. In such schemes, the effect of a digital signature is reused
many times over subsequent messages (containing pre-images
of a specific hash). The concept of a hash chain was first
proposed for use in an authentication scheme by Lamport [35].
Recently, Weimerskirch et al. adopted a hash chain technique
for efficient user recognition based on weak authentication
[37].
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents our privacy preserving authentication
and access control scheme. Consider the scenario that a mobile
user wants to be able to dynamically access the wireless or
other available services in PCEs. Due to the insecurity of
the wireless communication channel, the authorization of the
mobile user to the particular service she requests should be
verified and the subsequent data traffic should be protected.
Moreover, the mobile user should have the full control of
her context privacy. That is, the mobile user’s context in-
formation like location, time, and transaction profiles, etc.,
should be known only by the mobile user herself; nobody
else, including the service she is interacting with, can get
the clue regarding the user’s context. Therefore, the design
considerations of the proposed scheme include: 1) provide
explicit mutual authentication between the mobile user and the
service; 2) allow mobile users to anonymously interact with the
service; 3) enable differentiated service access control among
different users; 4) provide flexibility and scalability to both
user and service sides; 5) generate fresh session keys to secure
the interaction if applicable; 6) have high efficiency in terms
of communication, computation, and management overheads;
7) provide easy accountability; 8) provide formally verified
correctness.
Conceptually, the proposed scheme works as follows. The
mobile user first generates some specific credentials (as will be
described in Section III.A), and then she gets these credentials
authorized from the services through the user authorization
protocol. The mobile user then uses the authorized credentials
to access the desired services, and performs mutual authentica-
tion with the service before actually using it. Note that at this
stage, the mobile user identifies herself only by presenting the
authorized credentials without disclosing any of her context
information. Upon the successful completion of the mutual
authentication process, both parties will share fresh session
keys which will be used to secure the subsequent data traffic of
the session. This is done through the user operational protocol.
A dispute resolution protocol is also designed to solve possible
disputes that might rise between the mobile users and service
providers. Table I lists the notations used throughout the
description of the protocols for ease of reference. Note that we
assume users are capable of manipulating the source addresses
of the outgoing Medium Access Control (MAC)1 frames.
This assumption is prerequisite for anonymous communication
otherwise one can easily identify a user based on her unique
MAC address. Detailed technique on this can be found, for
example, in [20] and is out the scope of this paper.
A. User Authorization Protocol
The purpose of the user authentication protocol is to estab-
lish the security credentials between mobile users and service
providers, which can be used as the security anchor in the
subsequent mutual authentication processes whenever a mobile
user attempts to access a service. In our user authorization
protocol, the mobile user and the corresponding service (i.e.,
the authentication server) need to authenticate each other
first. This is typically done through some out-of-band non-
cryptographic technique. The mobile user needs to register
herself as a legal user of some service type the service
provides. She obtains the public keys of the services of which
she is entitled to use. She also needs to obtain a certificate
CertU which binds her identity U to her public key PubKU ,
signed by the private key of the service PriKS . Then, the
mobile user executes the user authorization protocol to submit
her credential and to obtain the signed credential from the
authentication server.
Our user authorization protocol is based on blind signature
[16], which hides the association between the authorized cre-
dential and the mobile user’s real identity. The user’s context
information can therefore be concealed from the service.
Further, through a deliberately designed combination with
hash chain technique, a series of authorized credentials, i.e., a
credential chain2, can be obtained by the mobile user in one
protocol run, which increases the protocol efficiency.
The proposed user authorization protocol contains two
steps: 1) credential generation, and 2) credential authoriza-
tion. The mobile user generates her own specific credentials
as shown in Table II:
The mobile user first generates two fresh nonces. Then she
signs her own identity together with one fresh nonce using
her private key. Next, she computes the anchor value C0 of
the credential chain with the signature. Clearly, the signature
contained in C0 provides non-repudiation property. This is
true because only the mobile user herself can generate it and
1Note that MAC is used to stand for both Message Authentication Code
and Medium Access Control.
2The same notion is used in [43] but with a different definition. In [43], a
credential chain means a delegation chain from the source of authority to the
requester.
4U A mobile user that is usually identified by her public key and can belong to some user group(s).
S Service provider or its authentication server which is used to authenticate the user for the purpose of access control.
M User group manager that can act as an agent for group members.
TTP Trusted third party, an entity which is trusted by both the mobile user and the service provider
SID A service type identifier, which describes a selected subset of the available service pool that can be accessed by a
particular mobile user, is identified by a unique public key. Different users may belong to the same service type.
P Service access point. For wireless networking service, it represents the access point (AP ).
PubKA, P riKA Public and private key pair of entity A.
KAB Shared secret key between entities A and B.
m, Xm Message m and its corresponding ciphertext.
(m0, m1) Concatenation of two messages.
{m}PubKA Encrypt message m with the public key of entity A.
{m}PriKA Sign message m with the private key of entity A. If not otherwise stated, message m is recoverable.
{m}KAB Encrypt message m by symmetric key algorithm with the secret key shared between entities A and B.
h() A cryptographic secure one-way hash function, or one-way hash function in short, such as MD5 [34].
hKAB (m) A cryptographic secure Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm, computing the message digest of message
m with key KAB .
hj(m) Hash message m j times: h1(m) = h(m), hj(m) = h(hj−1(m)), j = 2, 3, 4, ....
rA A nonce generated by entity A, usually it is 64-bit pseudo random number.
Cj , j = 0, 1, 2, . . . A series of authorized credentials used by an entity to obtain service access permission.
CertA A certificate which binds entity A with her public key PubKA.
TABLE I
NOTATION
Credential Generation:
1. generate two fresh nonces: r′
U
and r′′
U
.
2. sign her own ID with a fresh nonce r′′
U
:{U, r′′
U
}PriKU .
3. compute the anchor value C0 of the credential chain as
C0 = h(r′′
U
, U, {U, r′′
U
}PriKU ),
4. compute the credential chain Cj = hj(C0), j ≤ n, with length n.
5. blind Cn as CU = {r′U}PubKSID × C
n.
TABLE II
CREDENTIAL GENERATION
Credential Authorization:
U S
U, CU , CertU, SID
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
authorization request
6. Verify CertU with PubKS .
7. Sign CU : CS = {CU}PriKSID
= r′
U
× {Cn}PriKSID .
CS
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
authorization comfirmation
8. Decrypt and verify U, S.
9. Compute CS/r′U and obtain (C
n, {Cn}PriKSID ).
TABLE III
CREDENTIAL AUTHORIZATION
the fresh nonce guarantees its freshness. Then, a credential
chain is computed via hash operation. The length n can be
adjusted to the proper value depending on the actual frequency
of usage and storage capability. In the last step, the mobile
user blinds credential chain tail Cn by using blind signature
technique. Next, the mobile user sends out the blinded Cn for
authorization as shown in Table III. The authentication server
signs Cn with the private key of the requested service type
and returns the signed credential back to the mobile user.
• Besides the general public key PubKS for user authen-
tication purpose, the service maintains a pool of public
keys corresponding to different service types. We assume
that the mapping between the service type identifier SID
and its corresponding public key is clear to the mobile
user. The authorized credentials of different service types
are actually signed by the different private keys. This
allows for differentiated access control in the subsequent
stage. If the scope and the meaning of service types
is carefully defined and the services are therefore well
classified, the combinational usage of several authorized
credentials at the same time can further improve the
ability to enable higher level differentiated service ac-
cess control. This will also improve the flexibility and
scalability of the proposed scheme.
• Once the signed credential is returned to the mobile
user, the computation of CS/r′U indeed results in a valid
signature on Cn due to the property of blind signature.
Therefore, after the protocol execution, the mobile user
holds a verifiable authenticator - credential Cn and its
signature. Although the authentication server does not
know what the value of Cn is at the time it signs it,
the authenticity of Cn can be verified by the signature.
Therefore, once the authenticator is submitted to the
authentication server, the authentication server will be
able to verify and grant the service request. However,
it still has no information about who the user is, except
for her requested service type.
• Although the authentication server signs only the n-
th credential Cn, the remaining hash chain values C0
through Cn−1 are authorized implicitly at the same time,
due to the one-wayness nature of the hash function. Note
that the values of the credential hash chain should never
be revealed to any third party.
• The mobile user can also generate several different cre-
dential hash chains at the same time, and get each Cn
signed by the authentication server simultaneously in one
protocol run. Hence, the protocol efficiency can be further
improved, as well as the flexibility.
The user authorization protocol allows the mobile user to
obtain the authorized credentials from the service provider.
Note that the user authorization protocol runs only when
the mobile user’s authorized credentials are exhausted or for
the first time registration. The user authorization protocol is
highly flexible. It can be accomplished via both online and
off-line approaches (i.e., in-person interaction and so on). It
5can also be accomplished through the agent of the mobile
users. We can easily imagine that the network manager or
administration staff can acquire the authorized credentials from
the service providers on behalf of the users in a company
and then distribute them to the user. This delegable feature
greatly improves the usage flexibility of the mobile users and
allows dynamic authorization. It also significantly simplifies
the management overheads at the service side. The authenti-
cation server is now able to manage only one certificate for
each user group, instead of those of all group members.
B. The User Operational Protocol
The user operational protocol allows a mobile user to safely
enjoy different kinds of services she is authorized to in PCEs at
anytime, from anywhere without disclosing any of her context
information unless she is willing to do so and it is absolutely
necessary (e.g., in case of disputes). Conceptually, the user
operational protocol works as follows.
The mobile user first sends an access request, which con-
tains a service access capability claim and an authenticator
used to prove her legitimacy to the service requested, to the
service access point such as the wireless network access point
or a network printer. The authenticator includes an autho-
rized credential and a fresh nonce. The service access point
simply forwards this access request message to its back end
authentication server for authentication. Upon receiving the
forwarded access request, the authentication server decrypts
and verifies the authenticity of the contained credential. The
authentication server also checks whether the current service
access point conforms to the user’s service type. If both results
are positive, the authentication server ascertains that the mobile
user is indeed authorized to access this particular service
although it has no idea who the mobile user is, except for
the service type the user belongs to. Hence, it replies to the
service access point with an access grant, which otherwise
would be an access deny message. The access grant message
contains the decrypted authenticator information of the mobile
user it just verified. We assume that there is a secure tunnel
(e.g., IPsec ESP mode [26]) between the service access point
and its back end authentication server so that the former can
securely get this piece of secret information sent by the latter.
Note that this process is transparent to the mobile user. The
service access point then computes two fresh session keys
(i.e., encryption key and integrity key) with the obtained secret
information and generates a fresh nonce of its own. Next the
service access point encrypts the obtained secret information
and its own identity with one of the new session keys (i.e.,
encryption key) and finally, replies to the mobile user with
an access grant message, containing the fresh nonce and the
previous encrypted information. Upon receiving this message,
the mobile user could compute two session keys in the same
manner. After decrypting the access grant message with the
shared encryption key, the mobile user now authenticates
the service side by checking the validity of the decrypted
value with her own. If the result is positive, the mobile user
ascertains that the current service is legal. This concludes the
mutual authentication, and now both parties share two fresh
session keys, which can be used to secure the subsequent data
traffic in this session. The user operational protocol is outlined
in Table IV, describing a successful protocol run.
• In the access request message 1), the mobile user encrypts
a fresh nonce rU and authorized credential Cj with
service’s public key which is used for authentication
purpose. The encryption operation has dual purposes: 1)
keep the secrecy of rU and Cj from eavesdropping; 2)
service authentication, because only the user’s intended
legitimate service can decrypt the message correctly. The
SID is provided to claim user’s capability to access the
targeted service.
• When the authorized credential chain is used for the
first time, i.e., Cj = Cn, the mobile user should
send both Cn and its signature for authentication. In
this case, the access request message 1) would be:
{rU , C
n, {Cn}PriKSID}PubKS . Each credential is used
exactly once, that is, used in only one session and is
obsoleted afterwards. Hence, an authorized credential
chain of length n can be used to access the services
for n sessions before all credentials are exhausted. The
use of a different credential for each session is necessary
to defend against the replay attack and possible double
spending problem (e.g., for accountability).
• The authentication of the submitted credential at the
service side is as follows: If a credential is submitted
together with its signature, that is, (Cn, {Cn}PriKSID),
the authentication server verifies the signature using cor-
responding public key by referring to SID in the same
message. A negative result will trigger an access deny
message, sent to the service access point. A positive
result confirms the validity of the submitted credential.
A duplication check on Cn should be first executed
before signature verification to prevent a potential double
spending of Cn. Upon success of the verification, the au-
thentication server saves Cn according to its service type.
Recall that in the last subsection, we pointed out that each
different public key is used to bind a particular service
type. Thus, although the authentication server couldn’t
know who the user is, it does know this user’s capability
to access the services, that is, whether she is eligible
for the requested service or not through the submitted
credential. Hence, a differentiated service access control
is easily realized.
If the submitted credential is a single value Cj , the back
end server simply verify whether h(Cj) matches the
currently stored credential whose belonging hash chain
is indexed by Cn. The authentication server then updates
the currently stored Cj+1 with Cj . The remaining oper-
ation is the same as above. Note that, for each different
credential chain, the authentication server stores exactly
two values: the signed Cn and the newest (current) Cj .
This is for dual purposes: 1) for the ease of credential
authentication on Cj , j < n; 2) prevent potential double
spending of the credentials for all Cjs.
• The traffic between the service access point and its back
end server is assumed to be protected by private or
6U P S
1. generate rU .
2. compute {rU , Cj}PubKS ,
0 < j ≤ n. SID, {rU , Cj , Cn}PubKS
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1) access request SID, {rU , Cj , Cn}PubKS
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1) access request 3. decrypt rU , Cj , Cn.
4. verify Cj .
rU , C
j
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
2) access acknowledgement
5. generate rP .
6. compute KUP = h(Cj , rP , rU , 0).
rP , {rU , P}KUP K
′
UP
= h(Cj , rP , rU , 1).
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
2) access acknowledgement
7. compute KUP = h(Cj , rP , rU , 0),
K′
UP
= h(Cj , rP , rU , 1).
8. decrypt and verifies rU , Cj , P .
9. encrypt Xm0 = {m0}K′
UP
.
10. compute hKUP (Xm0 ).
rP , rU , Xm0 , hKUP (Xm0 )
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
3) authenticated data traffic 11. verify Xm0 using KUP .
... ... 12. decrypt m0 using K′UP .
... ...
... ...
rP , rU , Xmi , hKUP (Xmi )
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
i) authenticated data traffic
TABLE IV
THE USER OPERATIONAL PROTOCOL
previously established secure tunnel, which is beyond the
design range of this protocol.
• The service access point has no responsibility for user
authentication. It simply defers this job to its back end
server. The computation and management overheads at
the service access point are minimized and little storage
capability is required: 1) no public key operations; 2) no
long term key and certificate management; 3) session keys
are discarded once the session is terminated; 4) hash and
symmetric key operations only. Hence, it is very simple
and efficient, which could greatly decreases its cost and
helps wide deployments.
• The service access point and the mobile user compute
the fresh session keys independently, and authentication
server has no control over the computed session keys.
The fresh nonce used in key generation guarantees the
freshness of the session keys. Two fresh session keys
are generated. One is for encryption and the other is for
integrity protection, i.e., generating the message authen-
tication code (MAC) [34].
• The fresh nonces rP , rU are then used by the mobile
user and the service access point to identify the session
between them, that is, binding the two communication
parties and the exchanged traffic together. We can see
that there is no way to identify the session between the
two otherwise, because both two parties may interact with
many other parties at the same time, especially for service
access point.
• The one-time usage feature of the authorized credentials
and its linkage with the service type provide effective
accountability. Similar to the micro-payment schemes, the
accounting mechanism can be easily incorporated into the
system in nearly the same manner. We point out that
double spending of the authorized credentials actually
does not affect the system security as proved in Section V.
Hence, the choice between one-time or multiple usage of
the authorized credentials can be a simple policy decision.
It also can be dynamically switched according to real
situations.
C. Extension for Out-of-Order Requests
Sometimes a mobile user might want to launch multiple
sessions simultaneously. Note that if the multiple sessions
are with respect to different service types, or if the multiple
sessions are of the same service type but come to the authen-
tication server in the same order as they were originated, the
proposed protocol can handle them well. However, if the mul-
tiple concurrent sessions are with respect to a single service,
but for some reasons (e.g., unexpected network problems, DoS
attacks), the access request messages arrive out of order at the
back end authentication server, one or more legitimate requests
will be deemed illegal by the user operational protocol we just
described. In this subsection, we present a simple extension
to the user operational protocol to deal with such out-of-order
arrival of the access requests at the authentication server.
Our solution is a sliding window based extension to the cre-
dential authentication procedure at the authentication server.
Recall that in the previous setting, each hash chain stores
7New arrival (Cj)new=Cj-1
CjBeginning
Cj-1
New arrival (Cj)new=Cj-3 Cj-3Cj-1
New arrival (Cj)new=Cj-4
New arrival (Cj)new=Cj-2
Cj-1 Cj-3 Cj-4
Cj-4
Cj
Cj
Cj
Cj Cj-1 Cj-3Cj-2
Fig. 3. An illustration of the sliding window based credential authentication
procedure (for k=5)
two values: Cn, used as the index of the hash chain, and Cj ,
the most recently used hash value. A submitted credential is
hashed only once and compared with Cj . In the extension, the
back end authentication server is allowed to store up to k + 1
hash values for each hash chain: Cn and a window of up to k
hash values. A submitted credential may be hashed up to k−1
times, once a hashed value is found equal to a value already
in the window, the credential may be accepted. The extension
works as follows. Obviously, at the beginning when all the
requests come in order, there is only one value kept in the
window - the most recently used value Cj . At this time, when
the next credential Cj1 comes: 1) if it comes in order, namely
j1 = j − 1 or Cj = h(Cj1), the window will move forward
by one place, which makes Cj1 the first value in the window
while the rest of the places in the window remains empty; 2)
if j − k < j1 < j − 1, which means that Cj1 is hashed more
than once to be equal to Cj , the window remains where it
is and the value Cj1 is saved at the corresponding location,
i.e., (j − j1 + 1)th place in the window; 3) otherwise, if a
match is not found after k hashes, the credential is rejected.
Similarly, when there are multiple credentials in the window,
the following process applies for the next arrived credential
Cj2 : 1) if Cj2 equals to any of the existing credentials, it
is a double submission and the corresponding session should
be rejected; 2) if j2 = j − 13, the credential is valid and the
window moves forward by one place which makes Cj2 the first
credential in the window. Further, if its next position (j2 − 1)
is not empty, the window will continue to move forward until
it reaches a value Cj3 whose next position (j3 − 1) is empty.
This operation will ensure that the 2nd location in the window
is always empty; 3) if j−k < j2 < j−1, the window remains
unmoved and the value Cj2 is saved at the corresponding
empty location in the window; 4) otherwise the credential is
simply rejected. Fig. 3 shows an example of how an out-of-
order arrival of requests is handled by this extension.
Note that in this extension, k (k << n) is the maximum
distance between two access requests that go out of order. The
requests are of the same type and from the same mobile user.
Since the time needed to complete the whole authentication
is in a scale of milliseconds or at worst seconds, it is very
unlikely that a mobile user can launch a large number of
sessions and have them go out of order. Therefore this number
3We still assume Cj is the first credential in the window.
could be very small. Note that the number of concurrent
sessions the user could have is not limited by k. A user may
still have a large number of concurrent sessions as long as she
initializes each of them with a small time separation.
In the proposed user operational protocol, we assume that
an incomplete session will always be due to the failure of the
mobile user. The packets lost in the network can be resent
by reliable link/transport protocols or failure notification will
be returned to the source. If a mobile user gets no reply
after sending an access request message, it would resend the
same message again until obtaining a corresponding reply.
However, to make the scheme highly robust to unexpected
network problems, we may allow the window to move forward
when the last position of the window is filled while the second
position has yet not filled. On the other hand, as long as an
access request message is successfully received and processed
(replied) by the service access point (i.e., as long as an access
acknowledgement message is sent back to the mobile user by
the service side), the submitted credential is void thereafter
even if the mobile user may fail to continue the subsequent
session. Note that the access acknowledgement message may
be resent many times before the session is aborted by the
service access point. Since we generally consider micro-
payment case, dropping a single credential occasionally does
not affect much on accountability.
IV. CORRECTNESS VERIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED
SCHEME
In this section, we formally verify the correctness of the
proposed user operational protocol, based on the BAN logic
[12], which is a formal logic widely used to reason about
beliefs, encryption, and protocols. Although BAN logic does
have its own limitations, it is simple and has been successfully
applied to many protocols. Protocol correctness means that,
after the protocol execution both of the communication parties
ascertain that they are sharing a fresh session key and both are
sure that the same belief is held by the other side too. Table
V expresses this verification goal following the BAN logic.
In order to eliminate the expression complexity, we simplify
the two protocols into their generic types. In the following
description in this section, we use the following notations by
convention: A and B are two entities; Kab is the fresh session
key shared between A and B; (Ka, K−1a ) and (Kb, K
−1
b ) are
the public/private key pairs of entity A and B, respectively;
other notation follow those of BAN logic [12].
Verification Goals:
1. A |≡ A
Kab
←→ B 2. B |≡ A
Kab
←→ B
3. A |≡ B |≡ A
Kab
←→ B 4. B |≡ A |≡ A
Kab
←→ B
TABLE V
GOALS OF THE CORRECTNESS VERIFICATION
In the user operational protocol, the service access point and
the back end authentication server trust the authenticity and
integrity of the messages exchanged between them, because
a secure communication channel is assumed between them.
Therefore, without loss of generality, we simplify the user
operational protocol into the following generic type as shown
8in Table VI, which is further idealized in the same table.
We omit the unnecessary steps. We focus on the messages
exchanged between the mobile user and the service access
point and verify whether both parties can ascertain that they
share a fresh session key Kab with each other.
Protocol Generic Type:
Message 1 A −→ B : {Na, Cj}Kb
Message 2 B −→ A : Nb, {Na, Cj , B}Kab
Message 3 A −→ B : Nb, {m}Kab
Session key: Kab = h(Na, Nb, Cj)
Idealized protocol:
Message 1 A −→ B : {Na, A
Cj
⇀↽ B}Kb
Message 2 B −→ A : {Na, A
Cj
⇀↽ B, A
Kab
←→ B}Kab
Message 3 A −→ B : {A
Kab
←→ B}Kab
TABLE VI
GENERIC TYPE OF THE USER OPERATIONAL PROTOCOL
The assumptions we make before the verification are listed
below:
1. A |≡ Kb7→ B 2. B |≡ Kb7→ B 3. A |≡ ](Na)
4. B |≡ ](Nb) 5. A |≡ A
Cj
⇀↽ B 6. B |≡ A
Cj
⇀↽ B
7. A |≡ B |≡ A
Cj
⇀↽ B 8. B |≡ A |≡ A
Cj
⇀↽ B
9. A |≡ ](A
Cj
⇀↽ B) 10. B |≡ ](A
Cj
⇀↽ B)
11. A |≡ B |⇒ A Kab←→ B 12. B |≡ A Kab←→ B
13. B |≡ A |∼ (A Kab←→ B)
The first two assumptions state that both entity A and B
believe that B possesses a public key Kb. Assumptions (3) and
(4) mean that A and B generate two fresh nonces Na and Nb,
and therefore, assure their freshness, respectively. Assumptions
(5-10) are about the authorized credentials shared between the
two parties. When j = n, the authentication server believes
that Cn is the secret shared between an authorized user and
itself, because it can easily verify the authenticity of Cn
through the attached signature. So although the authentication
server has no information about who the mobile user is, still
it believes that Cn is an authentic secret shared between the
two. The blind signature technique and our user authorization
protocol ensure this very nice property. When j < n, the
authentication server holds the same belief because of the
one-wayness property of the hash chain. The Cn values, after
verification, are stored in the authentication server to prevent
possible reuse of the same value4, which ensures the freshness
of the Cn values. Each Cj (j < n) is guaranteed to be
fresh, e.g., used only once, because the matching window is
constantly moving whenever a Cj value has been used. The
formal verification on these beliefs on hash chain scheme can
be found in [37] and is omitted here due to the space limitation.
Assumption (11) tells that A believes B has jurisdiction right
over Kab, because once A generates Na and sends it to
B together with shared secret Cj , the value of final Kab
is determined by the nonce Nb generated by B from the
viewpoint of A. Assumptions (12) and (13) hold because B
4In this case, a mechanism to obsolete old Cn values is necessary. For
example, the authentication server can change the public/private key pairs for
the service types periodically.
invents the fresh session key Kab with a shared secret between
A and B and a fresh nonce chosen by itself. The verification
is outlined in Table VII.
Verification:
Message 1 A −→ B : {Na, A
Cj
⇀↽ B}Kb
14. B ¢ (Na, A
Cj
⇀↽ B) //(2), Seeing rule
Message 2 B −→ A : {Na, A
Cj
⇀↽ B, A
Kab
←→ B}Kab
15. A¢ {Na, A
Cj
⇀↽ B, A
Kab
←→ B}Kab
16. A |≡ B |∼ (Na, A
Cj
⇀↽ B, A
Kab
←→ B) //(5),(15), Msg.-meaning rule
17. A |≡ B |≡ (Na, A
Cj
⇀↽ B, A
Kab
←→ B) //(3),(16), Nonce-veri. rule
and Freshness rule
18. A |≡ B |≡ A
Kab
←→ B //(17), Belief rule
19. A |≡ A
Kab
←→ B //(11),(18), Jurisdiction rule
Message 3 A −→ B : {A
Kab
←→ B}Kab
20. B ¢ {A
Kab
←→ B}Kab
21.B |≡ A
Kab
←→ B //(12)
22.B |≡ ](A
Kab
←→ B) //(13)
23. B |≡ A |∼ (A
Kab
←→ B) //(20),(21), Msg.-meaning rule
24. B |≡ A |≡ A
Kab
←→ B //(22),(23), Nonce-veri. rule
TABLE VII
VERIFICATION OF THE USER OPERATIONAL PROTOCOL
(18), (19), (21) and (24) together accomplish the verifica-
tion. Note that the assumptions (9) and (10) are not used in the
verification, which means that even if the authorized credential
is not fresh, the correctness of the protocol still holds. This
property implies that the authorized credentials can be reused
without affecting the system security.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
A. Security Related Properties of the Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme exhibits many nice security related
properties as discussed below:
• Mutual Authentication: In the proposed scheme, the
mobile user is authenticated based on her authorized
credential, in the sense that the service knows the user
is indeed legal and authorized. The service authenticates
itself to the user through its public key certificate and
by showing its knowledge of the corresponding private
key. The mutual authentication is highly necessary in the
PCEs as discussed before to prevent potential malicious
attacks from the both sides.
• User Context Privacy: The users’ context privacy is
well protected by the proposed scheme, only absolutely
necessary information is known to the service, i.e., users’
service type, in order to grant appropriate access. Through
the blind signature technique, the mobile users could be
authenticated anonymously without disclosing any other
information. All the service side knows is that some
legal users are accessing some particular services. The
information is also protected against the outsiders. No
third party has the ability to acquire the user’s context
information, as all the interaction traffic is well protected.
9• Non-Linkability: Ideally, non-linkability means that, for
both insiders (i.e., service) and outsiders: 1) Neither of
them could ascribe any session to a particular user; 2)
Neither of them could link two different sessions to
the same user [42]. In the proposed scheme, ideal non-
linkability is achieved with respect to outsiders. Because
the authorized credential is never transmitted in plaintext,
and is always combined with fresh nonce in the message,
an outsider cannot ascribe a session to a particular user,
neither can he ascribe two sessions to a same user.
Hence, users’ transaction profiles are well protected. On
the other hand, using hashing chain could allow the
service provider to link up to n sessions using the hash
values from the same chain to a same user, where n
is the length of the hash chain. However, the service
provider can not ascribe such information to a particular
user due to the underlying blind signature technique
used. In addition, such linkage is limited to n sessions
only, there’s no relationship among different hash chains.
Therefore, there’s no inter-hash-chain information can
be accumulated by the service provider. Hence, users’
transaction profile can still be well protected from the
service provider.
• Accountability & Non-Transferability Equivalency: In
the proposed scheme, the credentials are authorized only
when the mobile user is explicitly authenticated. The
one-time usage property of the authorized credentials
prevents double spending problem and further provides
good accounting capability which allows the accounting
function be easily incorporated5. Furthermore, from the
service point of view, the proposed scheme provides
equivalent Non-Transferability. That is, even the creden-
tials are delegated among users, no harm is done to the
service provider in the sense that the authorized user is
responsible for all the service received by her authorized
credentials. This novel feature greatly reduces the service
abuse problem worried by the service providers. Using
blind signature [21] alone can not provide this property
because there’s no way to prevent the double spending
problem and hence, no way to prevent service abuse
problem.
• Data Traffic Protection: The user operational protocol
generates fresh session keys to protect the interaction
data traffic between the mobile user and the service. Data
confidentiality and integrity can be provided based on
the symmetric cryptography.
• Differentiated Service Access Control: By classifying
the mobile users into different service types, differen-
tiated service access control is enabled in our scheme.
Different mobile users are authorized accordingly based
on the service types to which they belong. User au-
thorization is therefore, accomplished in a differentiated
way. Moreover, the combinational usage of the different
credentials may help to provide high level differentiated
service access control, which is beyond the scope of this
5For example, we can limit the amount of service one credential is entitled
thus making the amount of service measurable.
This paper [21] [24]
Concrete Protocol Yes Yes No
Mutual Authentication Yes Yes No
User Context Privacy Yes Yes Not to
services
Non-Linkability Yes to outsiders, No Not to
partially yes to services services
Non-Transferability Almost No N/A
Equivalency Yes
Data Confidentiality Yes Easy to No
obtain
Message Integrity Yes Yes No
Accounting Capability Yes No Yes
Differentiated Service Yes No Yes
Access Control
Provable Security Yes No N/A
TABLE VIII
PROTOCOL SECURITY FEATURES COMPARISON
paper.
• Formally Verified Correctness: The proposed scheme is
secure as sound as the underlying cryptosystem against
both passive and active attacks. We verified the correct-
ness of the proposed scheme in the above section based
on the well known BAN logic.
We compare our scheme to other similar approaches that
are intended to provide anonymous interactions between the
users and the services in Table VIII. The advantage of our
scheme is obvious.
B. Performance of the Proposed Scheme
Despite the number of desirable security properties pro-
vided, the proposed scheme is extremely lightweight. We
analyze the overheads introduced in this subsection.
• Management Overhead: The proposed scheme involves
minimal management overheads (e.g., human interac-
tion). The service provider needs to manage one certifi-
cate per user and the corresponding user profile. Due to
the delegation property, this number can be significantly
reduced to that of the user groups (i.e., one user per
group). On the other side, each mobile user needs to
manage the certificates of the service provider and the
different service types she belongs to.
• Storage Overhead: While the protocol is running, the
back end authentication server stores two values (Cj , Cn)
for each currently in-use credential chain and one value
(Cn) for each of the used but unexpired chain. The
service access point maintains no permanent user infor-
mation or key information. Each service access point
only stores two session keys per session, besides two
nonces to identify that session. The mobile user stores
the two random nonces (r′U , r
′′
U ), and the credential chains
authorized to her (e.g., C0, . . . , Cn and signature of Cn).
In addition, the mobile user should store two nonces and
two session keys for each ongoing session. The method
to store a hash chain can have a computation and storage
trade-off. The mobile user can also choose to store the
anchor value and the current value of the hash chain only
and compute the needed value on-the-fly.
• Communication Overhead: The user operational pro-
tocol requires two-round to accomplish mutual authenti-
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Public Key Sig. Nonce Hash Sym. Key
Oper. Veri. Gen. Oper. Oper.
U 1(off-line) 0 1 2 3
Ours P 0 0 1 2 3
S 1(online) 1/n 0 0 0
U 1(off-line) 0 0 1 1
[21] P 0 1(online) 0 1 1
S 1(online) 1(online) 0 1 1
TABLE IX
PROTOCOL COMPUTATION OVERHEADS COMPARISON
cation and session key establishment between the user
and the service. Note that two-round is the minimum
number for any authenticated key establishment protocol
to fulfill its goal. Therefore, the proposed scheme is
highly efficient in the sense of communication overhead.
• Computation Overhead: The mobile user performs one
public key operation per session and all the remaining are
hash and symmetric cryptographic operations. The public
key operation can be done off-line. The authentication
server also needs to do one public key operation per
session, and one additional signature verification for
each authorized credential chain (which could be used
for n sessions). The service access point is completely
exempted from performing public key operations. We
compare in Table IX the computation overhead of the
proposed scheme with the scheme proposed in [21]. It is
observed that the proposed user operational protocol is
extremely lightweight.
Notice that our protocol is much more efficient than [21],
despite so many additional security features as discussed
above. In [21], the authentication server needs to perform one
signature verification every session in addition to one public
key decryption. The server therefore, could be the bottleneck
of the whole system, due to the potential large amount of
concurrent transactions. Moreover, the service access point is
required to perform one public key operation for each session,
which is also a heavy burden to it. For instance, a wireless
access point will have a great trouble to perform public key
operations for every user in every session due to its constrained
computation capability.
VI. RELATED WORK
Recently, quite a few papers have been published to address
the new security and privacy challenges in PCEs [7], [8],
[9], [11], [15], [19], [21], [24], [25], [27], [30], [39], [40].
However, most of these results fall in the scope of establishing
general security framework and identifying general security
requirements, without providing concrete security protocols.
Some of these efforts focused on designing specific security
infrastructures to protect user context privacy like location
information from service providers. The MIST system [7], [8]
provides user anonymity through an overlay network assuming
the existence of a Lighthouse, which keeps all information
of all the users. In addition, performance degradation is un-
avoidable for systems that utilize MIX-network style approach
[14]. A proxy-based scheme can be found in [11]. Another
recent infrastructure based approach, LEXP, can be found in
[30]. Some efforts try to maximize user privacy by restricting
the access to users’ context information. Hengartner et al.
suggested an architecture to filter out user context information
[22].
The remaining efforts mostly focused on identity manipu-
lation approaches, most of which originated from Chaum’s
anonymous ID based scheme in 1985 [18]. This general
scheme allows users to interact with different services anony-
mously, using pseudonyms. Pseudonyms cannot be linked, but
are formed in such a way that a user can prove to one service
about his relationship with another using a “statement”. Such
a statement is called a credential. An in-depth description and
analysis of different pseudonym systems can be found in [28].
Jendricke et al. [24] introduced an identity management
system in PCEs where a user is issued multiple identities,
and the user uses them depending on applications. The paper
only presented a general framework of using virtual identities
to protect user privacy while performing access control and
authentication, but did not give any concrete protocols. More
recently, He et al. [21] presented a simple anonymous ID
scheme for PCEs, which is a direct application of Chaum’s
blind signature technique [16]. However, the scheme suffers
from several drawbacks as discussed in Section V.
Henrici and Muller [23] utilized hash functions to re-
compute identifiers of a RFID device every time it sends a
request to service providers. Their intention was to protect the
location privacy of RFID devices. Another approach proposed
by Weimerskirch et al. uses hash functions to realize efficient
weak authentication [37]. In order to avoid leakage of user’s
MAC address or IP address at the lower levels, Gruteser et
al. [20] came up with a method to hide user’s MAC address
with anonymous IDs so that the user can not be tracked in a
wireless LAN environment.
VII. CONCLUSION
In pervasive computing, mobile users interact seamlessly
with abundant services anytime, anywhere. However, user
privacy is at great risk in the pervasive computing environment
(PCE) because of its inherent pervasive and heterogenous
nature. Legitimate service providers may also suffer from
abuse from unauthorized or malicious users. The conflict
between user privacy protection and user authentication make
security design in PCEs a very challenging task.
In this paper, we proposed a privacy preserving authentica-
tion and access control scheme to secure interactions between
mobile users and services in PCEs. On the one side, the pro-
posed scheme provides explicit mutual authentication between
a mobile user and a service; on the other side, it allows the
mobile user to anonymously interact with the service. Hence,
the proposed scheme successfully satisfies concerns of both
parties - security and privacy. The scheme integrates two
cryptographic primitives, blind signature and hash chain, into a
highly flexible and lightweight authentication and session key
establishment protocol. Differentiated service access control
is also enabled in the proposed scheme by classifying mobile
users into different service types. The correctness of the
proposed authentication and key establishment protocol was
formally verified based on BAN logic.
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In the future, we would like to extend our scheme to context-
aware services in PCEs. In this scenario, certain aspects of
user context information should be authenticated and presented
to the services. How to disclose necessary authenticated user
context information to the context-aware services without
affecting user privacy is our future work.
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